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Belsky: Locke v. Davey: States' Rights Meet the New Establishment Clause

LOCKE V. DA VEY: STATES' RIGHTS MEET THE
NEW ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

Martin H. Belsky*
In early 2001, a number of Oklahoma state representatives introduced
Oklahoma House Bill 1859. This proposed legislation stated that the Department
of Corrections and private correctional facilities were to:
(1) promote the availability and development of faith-based programs;
(2) keep records on recidivism rates for all inmates participating in faithbased or religious programs;
(3) increase the number of volunteers ministering to inmates in various
faith-based institutions in the state; and
(4) develop community linkages with churches, synagogues, mosques, and
other faith-based institutions to assist in the release of participants back into
the community.
The legislation was opposed by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections on state
and federal constitutional grounds. The bill went nowhere.
In May of 2003, I was asked to address the annual Oklahoma Prison
Chaplain's Training Conference. The topic was to be "faith-based services."
Ministers of all faiths and all political affiliations wanted to know what the law was
concerning services they or church groups could provide to prisoners. Specifically,
they wanted me to address the validity of proposed legislation that would have
promoted a new "faith-based re-entry program" for prisoners.1 Again, the
Oklahoma Department of Corrections was opposing the legislation, based on state
and federal constitutional grounds.
I thought the issue was clear. For a number of years, the Supreme Court had
2
been moving away from the so-called "Lemon test," established in 1971. That
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. J.D., Columbia University (1968).
I would like to thank Jeannette F. Liu for her research assistance on this article.
1. This proposal was in fact later introduced as Senate Bill 1486, in the Second Session of the 49th
Legislature. The bill, which has now become law in Oklahoma, provided that:
All services available in the reentry program shall be selected after open bid and the
Department shall give equal consideration to faith-based and secular providers in all service
provider categories. Offenders assigned to the re-entry program shall have the option of
selecting whether to follow a faith-based or secular continuum of services upon assignment
to the program.
2. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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three-part standard, premised on a strict separation of church and state, was an
almost total bar on government funding, directly or indirectly, of religion.3
Because of a change in the membership of the Court, more recent Supreme Court
cases have implicitly overruled the three-part Lemon test and said that a rule or
regulation "does not violate the Establishment Clause unless it indicates a
government 'endorsement' of religion or the law actually 'coerces' someone to be
involved in a religious activity.",4 Neutrality was the key. Under this new analysis,
faith-based programs, I believed, were now presumptively constitutional.5
6
Moreover, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
the Supreme Court had recently

approved an Ohio voucher program that gave students and their parents the
choice to use government money (vouchers) for private secular or parochial
schools. Specifically, the Court held this was a "neutral program of private choice,
where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of the numerous

independent decisions of private individuals,
[and thus did not carry] with it the
7
imprimatur of government endorsement.,
Surely, if the Constitution can allow students and parents to receive
government money and attend a religious school, it would allow government

money for prisoners or substance abusers to select faith-based services.8 In my
mind, the issue of faith-based services was no longer a legal or constitutional
question, but only a political one. 9
Lawyers from the Oklahoma Department of Corrections disagreed.
Oklahoma is one of thirty-seven states that had state religion clauses, called
"Blaine Amendments," that provided independent bars to government funding of

3. The three-part review of laws under the establishment prong, described in Lemon, is as follows:
"First, the statute [or rule] must have a secular purpose [sic]." In other words, there must be
a valid non-religious reason for the new law. "[S]econd, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion." In short, the new regulation must be
neutral towards religion and religions. "[Flinally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion."' Any rule that forced government at any level to
become intertwined with religious institutions or principles was prohibited.
Martin H. Belsky, Antidisestablishmentarianism:The Religion Clauses at the End of the Millennium, 33
Tulsa L.J. 93, 94 (1997) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13) (footnotes omitted).
4. Id. at 95-96 (footnotes omitted).
5. See Aaron Cain, Student Author, Faith-Based Initiative ProponentsBeware: The Key in Zelman
Is Not Just Neutrality, but Private Choice, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 979, 1016 (2004).
6. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,536 U.S. 639 (2002).
7. Id. at 655 (emphasis omitted).
8. See e.g. Freedomfrom Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003).
9. See Martin H. Belsky, School Vouchers: The Legal and Policy Arguments, Tulsa Kids Mag. 38,
38 (Aug. 2002):
The case [Zelman] was a close one, 5 to 4, and written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
While it may be possible that sometime in the future, new [J]ustices could be appointed to
replace one or more of those in the majority, it is likely that for the immediate future the
legality of vouchers has been settled. That still leaves the policy debate: should the
taxpayers fund a program that allows a student to pay for tuition at a school of his or her
choice, even if that school is a religious one, and what impact would this have on our present
public school system.
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religious entities or activities.10 While the various states' provisions differed,
Oklahoma's Blaine amendment was a complete bar to any government funding of
sectarian programs:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, donated, or used,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary, or sectarian institution as
such.1
Despite my own personal preferences, I disagreed with the legal advisors to
the Oklahoma Department of Corrections. This was a post-9/11 world. Faithbased services were being touted, with some evidence, as being successful, and
especially in education and treatment. 12 Oklahoma is a "Bible Belt" state.
Whether I agreed or disagreed with the cases leading up to Zelman, I could not
believe that a state constitutional provision would be interpreted by the state
courts to be more restrictive than the federal Establishment Clause. 3 Moreover, I
believed that the federal courts would not allow state laws to be upheld that were
inconsistent with federal policy, 4 as expressed by the federal legislature, and
approved by16the Supreme Court. 5
Oops!

This article will explore why my absolute certainty as to how the Court
would rule in Locke v. Davey 7 was so misplaced. Individual justices had to
balance their concerns about state power and sovereignty with a desire to lessen
government's ability to assist religious entities. Specifically, Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and even Chief Justice Rehnquist felt that a "play in the joints" between
these two philosophical premises allowed a particular state constitution to restrict
government aid to religion and religious institutions in that state, even where the
federal Constitution would allow and even encourage it.

10. See Michael J. Dailey, Student Author, Blaine's Bigotry: Preventing School Vouchers in
Oklahoma... Temporarily, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 207, 225-26 (2003).
11. Okla. Const. art. II, § 5.
12. See Freedom from Religion Found., 324 F.3d at 883-84 (noting that religion is an effective
treatment for some); John Cassidy, Schools Are Her Business: A Young Scholar Proposes a Radical
Plan, 75 The New Yorker 144, 144 (Oct. 18, 1999) (stating that a voucher system for schools could be
used to provide a better education and even to attain social goals such as racial integration).
13. Student author Toby J. Heytens, in the article, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 Va. L.
Rev. 117, 159-60 (2000), indicated that most state courts will try to interpret their state Blaine
amendments "to allow aid to private religious schools so long as the aid is not prohibited by the
Federal Establishment Clause." In Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1972), the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, in fact, did this. It basically disregarded the explicit language in its state Blaine
amendment, relied on its interpretation of the federal Establishment Clause, and upheld the right of
Oklahoma City to put up a cross on fair grounds.
14. See e.g. Exec. Or. 13279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77141 (Dec. 12, 2002).
15. See Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, & Thomas C. Berg, Religion and the Constitution
574-75 (Aspen L. & Bus. 2002). See also Dailey, supra n. 10, at 231, 234.
16. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Hitting the Wall: Religion Is Still Special under the
Constitution, Says the High Court, 27 Leg. Times 68, 68 (Mar. 15, 2004) (noting that the Davey decision
was a surprise to many).
17. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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THE BLAINE AMENDMENTS

The accepted historical analysis of Blaine Amendments 18 was expressed in a
recent article:
Most State Blaines arose in the mid to late 1800s, in response to a widespread
controversy over whether Roman Catholics could obtain access to public funding for
their schools. At that time, American public schools were overwhelmingly and
explicitly Protestant, and private schools were predominantly Catholic. Many
as possible, a
people wanted to keep public funds as far from Catholic schools
19
project zealously pursued and realized ...in the State Blaines.
Language of the various Blaine laws differed 2 but almost all barred "the use of
generally available public benefits.., because the recipient is a person who wants
to put them to a religious use or is a religiously affiliated organization."'"
The traditional wisdom before Locke v. Davey was that these laws,
developed in a time of and in response to religious prejudice, could not survive. 2
They were inconsistent with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence providing for a
less restrictive review of First Amendment limitations to funding of religious
entities and programs.23 Specifically, under a free speech analysis or free exercise
analysis, biased restrictions on state funding could not possibly be considered24 a
"compelling governmental interest" under the required "strict scrutiny" review.
This was not, however, the view of a "surprisingly lopsided" 25 seven-justice
majority in Davey.
In Davey, the Court reviewed a Washington state
constitutional provision that barred the giving of any state money for religious

18. These state laws are called "Blaine Amendments" because they are based on a proposed federal
constitutional amendment proposed by Republican presidential aspirant James G. Blaine. McConnell,
Garvey & Berg, supra n. 15, at 451-52. In 1876, the proposed amendment overwhelmingly passed the
House but did not reach the two-thirds requirement in the Senate. Id. at 452-53. This law became the
model for state laws and Congress "demanded the inclusion of such provisions as a condition to
statehood in the Dakotas, Montana, Washington, and New Mexico. By 1890, some 29 states had
enacted some form" of this provision. Id. at 457.
19. Kyle .Duncan, Secularism's Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72
Fordham L. Rev. 493, 495 (2003) (footnote omitted). See also Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview
and Evaltation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Policy 551, 556-576 (2003).
20. For a detailed survey of the various state Blaine provisions, see DeForrest, supra n. 18, at 576602.
21. Duncan, supra n. 18, at 495.
22. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000). See also Dailey, supra n. 10, at 210.
23. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29. See also Dailey, supra n. 10, at 231. But cf. Katie Axtell,
Student Author, Public Funding for Theological Training under the Free Exercise Clause: Pragmatic
Implications and Theoretical Questions Posed to the Supreme Court in Locke v. Davey, 27 Seattle U. L.
Rev. 585 (2003).
24. See Robert William Gall, The Past Should Not Shackle the Present: The Revival of a Legacy of
Religious Bigotry by Opponents of School Choice, 59 N.Y.U. Annual Survey Am. L. 413 (2003); Brandi
Richardson, Student Author, Eradicating Blaine's Legacy of Hate: Removing the Barrier to State
Funding of Religious Education, 52 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1041 (2003). See also Tony Mauro, Next School
Voucher Case to Contest Ancient Ban Born of Anti-Catholic Bias, 169 N.J. L.J. 486 (2002).
25. Tony Mauro, States Can Ban Scholarships for Theology: Rehnquist Leads 7-Vote Majority in
Washington State Case That Some See As Setback for School Voucher Programs,27 Leg. Times 7, 7
(Mar. 1, 2004).
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"worship, exercise or instruction."' 26 The Washington state legislature had created
a "Promise Scholarship Program 27to assist academically gifted students with
postsecondary education expenses.,
Joshua Davey received and sought to use this scholarship to pursue 2 8a
"double major in pastoral ministries and business management/administration
in order to become a minister. He sued in federal court to require the state to
allow him to use the scholarship for his studies. He based his claim on the Free
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment, and the
nondiscrimination guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause. 29
The federal district court rejected Davey's claims; the federal circuit court of
appeals reversed and said that Davey could not be denied the scholarship. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and as noted above, the "conventional
wisdom 30 was that the Court would quickly uphold the court of appeals. But it
didn't. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that there must be a "play
in the joints" between the two religion clauses of the First Amendment.31 The
state's "antiestablishment interests 3 2 are historic and legitimate. And, whatever
the history of Blaine amendments, the law does not suggest "animus towards
religion. 33
Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue, we therefore cannot
conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is
inherently constitutionally suspect.
Without a presumption of unconstitutionality, Davey's claim must fail. The
State's interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the
exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars. If
any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here. We need not
venture further into this difficult area in order to uphold 34the Promise Scholarship
Program as currently operated by the State of Washington.

26. Article 1, § 11 of Washington's Constitution provides in part as follows:
Religious Freedom. Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment,
belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or
disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby
secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support
of any religious establishment.
27. Davey, 540 U.S. at 715.
28. Id. at 717.
29. Id. at 718.
30. See Duncan, supra n. 18, at 593; Gall, supra n. 24, at 436; Richardson, supra n. 24, at 1078. But
cf. Axtell, supra n. 23, at 619-22.
31. Davey, 540 U.S. at 719.
32. Id. at 722.
33. Id. at 725.
34. Id. The Court also rejected the free speech and equal protection arguments:
Davey... contends that the Promise Scholarship Program is an unconstitutional viewpoint
restriction on speech. But the Promise Scholarship Program is not a forum for speech. The
purpose of the Promise Scholarship Program is to assist students from low- and middle-
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THE PLAY IN THE JOINTS

On first, and even repeated glances, it would appear that Davey is
inconsistent with prior Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, in the recent case
of Mitchell v. Helms,35 five jsutices upheld a federal statute that provided funds to
public and parochial schools. This was based on the relatively recent narrowing of
the scope of review of the propriety of state and federal laws to a determination of
neutrality and endorsement. Neutrality toward, and non-endorsement of, religion
were the new tests.36
Justice Thomas's plurality opinion explicitly rejected the premise of Blaine
laws:
Finally, hostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree
that we do not hesitate to disavow.... Opposition to aid to "sectarian" schools
acquired prominence in the 1870's with Congress' consideration (and near passage)
of the Blaine Amendment, which would have amended the Constitution to bar any
aid to sectarian institutions. Consideration of the amendment arose at a time of
pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics
in general, and it was an
37
open secret that "sectarian" was code for "Catholic."
Yet only four years later, in Davey, only Justices Thomas and Scalia would have
declared the Washington state constitutional provision to be in violation of the
federal Constitution.3 s
Others, I am confident, will discuss the theoretical "free exercise" arguments
to rationalize the Davey majority. I believe the vote can be analyzed more
pragmatically. Four justices-Breyer, 39 Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter-have
4
consistently voted for "a relatively strong separation between church and state."

income families with the cost of postsecondary education, not to "encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers." Our cases dealing with speech forums are simply inapplicable.
Davey also argues that the Equal Protection Clause protects against discrimination on the
basis of religion. Because we hold . . . that the program is not a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause, however, we apply rational-basis scrutiny to his equal protection claims.
For the reasons stated herein, the program passes such review.
Id. at 720 n. 3 (citations omitted).
35. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
36. See Belsky, supra n. 3. In Mitchell, Justice Thomas, writing for a four justice plurality, described
the "neutrality" test: "Considering [this law] in light of our more recent case law, we conclude that it
neither results in religious indoctrination by the government nor defines its recipients by reference to
religion." 530 U.S. at 808. Two justices concurred in Mitchell, in an opinion written by Justice
O'Connor. However, these justices believed more than neutrality was needed, and that law must not
impermissibly advance nor endorse religion. Id. at 867.
37. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29.
38. Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, joined in by Justice Thomas, 540 U.S. at 726, stated that the
Washington law was not neutral and discriminated against religion. Upholding it was therefore
inconsistent with recent Supreme Court precedent. This was not, in his mind, even a "close call" to
allow a "play in the joints." Id. at 728. Justice Thomas added in his own dissent that a degree in
theology "does not necessarily implicate religious devotion or faith." Id. at 734.
39. Justice Breyer has consistently voted with the four justice minority. See e.g. Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 240 (1997). In Mitchell, he joined Justice O'Connor in concurring in the judgment. 530
U.S. at 836. In that case, he probably felt that there was not "substantial" religious use. See
McConnell, Garvey, & Berg, supra n. 15, at 548.
40. Lupu & Tuttle, supran. 16, at 68.
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For Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, the issue must have been the balance
between the new Supreme Court precedents on the application of the religion
clauses and state authority and sovereignty.
III.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR

In reviewing whether the Government has crossed the line between
separation and advancement of religion, Justice O'Connor has moved away from
the traditional three-part Lemon test to an "endorsement" analysis. 41 Thus, the
federal government could provide tax credits and even funding for tuition for a
theology student.42
Justice O'Connor also includes the idea of "neutrality" in her analysis of the
validity of aid to religious entities.43 Under a neutrality concept, could the federal
government discriminate and not provide funding for theology students when it
does so for law students? It would seem to be a violation of the rights of religious
entities (under the Free Speech Clause) for the government to allow some groups
to use public facilities but not religious groups.44 For O'Connor, it is clearly a
violation for a public school or college to fund student organizations but not
religious student organizations.45 It would seem to also be a violation of the
concept of neutrality for a state to bar funding for a theology student when it
funds other students. 46
Justice O'Connor looked specifically at the issue of neutrality and the need
to avoid any anti-religious bias in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia.47 In Rosenberger, the University provided funding for
48
The
student organizations to publish newsletters, bulletins, and newspapers.
University would not fund the printing of "Wide Awake" by a student
organization, as it was a paper published by a "religious organization" barred from
funding by the University's guidelines.4 9 The state chose not to fund religious
publications. The Court held that it could not make that choice. Such

41. See e.g. Agostini, 521 U.S. 203.
42. See Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (funding for theology
student); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (providing a tax deduction for educational expenses
associated with religious schools). See also Justice O'Connor'sconcurring opinion in Witters, 474 U.S.
at 493.
43. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 838 (O'Connor, J., concurring):
I do not quarrel with the plurality's recognition that neutrality is an important reason for
upholding government-aid programs against Establishment Clause challenges. Our cases
have described neutrality in precisely this manner, and we have emphasized a program's
neutrality repeatedly in our decisions approving various forms of school aid.
See also Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,248-49 (1990).
44. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235.
45. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the U. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
46. Witters, 474 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
47. 515 U.S. 819.
48. Id. at 827.
49. Id.
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discrimination is a violation of First Amendment freedom of speech.
O'Connor concurred, and talked about the balancing needed:

Justice

This case lies at the intersection of the principle of government neutrality and
the prohibition on state funding of religious activities. It is clear that the University
has established a generally applicable program to encourage the free exchange of
ideas by its students, an expressive marketplace that includes some 15 student
publications with predictably divergent viewpoints. It is equally clear that
petitioners' viewpoint is religious and that publication of Wide Awake is a religious
activity, under both the University's regulation and a fair reading of our precedents.
Not to finance Wide Awake, according to petitioners, violates the principle of
neutrality by sending a message of hostility toward religion. To finance Wide
Awake, argues the University, violates the prohibition on direct state funding of
religious activities.
When two bedrock principles so conflict, understandably neither can provide
the definitive answer. Reliance on categorical platitudes is unavailing. Resolution
instead depends on the hard task of judging ....

Such judgment requires courts to

case. 50
draw lines, sometimes quite fine, based on the particular facts of each
Justice O'Conner, in her concurrence in Witters v. Washington Departmentof
Services for the Blind,51 talked about her other standard-non-endorsement. In
Witters, the state had barred funding to a blind person studying at a Christian
college, seeking to become a pastor.52 The Washington Supreme Court found
such funding to be in violation of the Establishment Clause. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, finding no such violation. The Clause did not bar such
and not to the religious institution.
funding because the money went to the 5student
'3
There was no "state support of religion.
There was no need to balance here. As Justice O'Connor noted in her
concurrence, "[T]he aid to religion at issue here is the result of petitioner's private
choice. No reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts before us an
inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief., 5 4 In
Davey, this straightforward rule now had to be balanced against an equally

50. Id. at 847.

51. 474 U.S. 481.
52. The State Commission and the lower state courts had found such funding to be in violation of
the state constitutional provision barring direct or indirect funding of religion. Id. at 483-84. This, of
course, is the same provision at issue in Davey. The Washington Supreme Court in Witters "declined to
ground its ruling on the Washington Constitution." Id. at 484.
53. Id. at 489. The Court left open the issue of the applicability of the Washington Constitution:
On remand, the state court is of course free to consider the applicability of the "far stricter"
We decline petitioner's invitation to
dictates of the Washington State Constitution ....
leapfrog consideration of those issues by holding that the Free Exercise Clause requires
Washington to extend vocational rehabilitation aid to petitioner regardless of what the State
Constitution commands or further factual development reveals, and we express no opinion
on that matter.
Id. at 489-90 (emphasis in original). On remand, the Washington Supreme Court found assistance to
the student to be barred by the Washington Constitution. Witters v. St. Commn. for the Blind, 771 P.2d
1119 (1989).
54. Witters, 474 U.S. at 493.
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important constitutional principle-the sovereign rights of states. For Justice
O'Connor, state sovereignty is at least as important a principle as any other
constitutional doctrine.55 It is the obligation of the Supreme Court, in balancing
rights and obligations, to protect state sovereignty:
The true "essence" of federalism is that the States as States have legitimate interests
which the National Government is bound to respect even though its laws are
supreme. If federalism so conceived and so carefully cultivated by the Framers of
our Constitution is to remain meaningful, this Court cannot abdicate its
compliance with
constitutional responsibility to oversee the Federal Government's
56
its duty to respect the legitimate interests ofthe States.
O'Connor's rhetoric indicates her continual strong support for tipping the
scales in favor of state power.5 7 For example, in New York v. United States,5 she
wrote for a 6-3 majority that the United States could not compel New York to
accept title to radioactive waste, even if it seemed to accept the comprehensive
legislative package that that requirement was part of:
In Chief Justice Chase's much-quoted words, "the preservation of the States, and
the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National
government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States." 59
And here, in Davey, the balancing is also affected by the fact that we are dealing
with a state constitutional provision. 6° We are also dealing with decisions by the
state Supreme Court upholding the validity of that provision.6'
In Gregory v. Ashcroft,62 the Supreme Court reviewed a Missouri state
constitutional provision that mandated retirement of most judges at age seventy.
This provision was found not to violate a federal statute. To avoid reaching the
constitutional issue, the federal statute was interpreted not to apply to state
judges. However, Justice O'Connor stressed the fact that in the constitutional
balance, state powers had to be adequately considered, 63 and particularly when a
state constitutional provision was involved.6
Thus, for Justice O'Connor, the balance had to be for state sovereignty. The
61
states should be allowed to decide how they are going to spend their own money.

55. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83-84 (2000) (Equal Protection Clause); Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991) (habeas corpus); Garciav. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (dissenting) (Commerce Clause). See also Block v. N.D., 461 U.S. 273, 293,
296 (1983) (dissenting) (conflict between two "sovereigns"-state and federal governments).
56. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 581 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original and citations omitted).
57. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-59 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
59. Id. at 162 (quoting Tex. v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 700 (1868)).
60. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460. Compare Witters, 771 P.2d at 1122-23.
61. Witters, 771 P.2d at 1119.
62. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
63. Id. at 457-59.
64. Id. at 460.
65. See Garcia,469 U.S. at 580 (dissenting).
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States could restrict, under their own constitutions, the funding of sectarian

entities-even if the federal government could not under its constitution. And the
state courts could interpret their own constitutional provisions to comply with the
will of their people. 66
IV.

Justice

Kennedy

JUSTICE KENNEDY

probably

goes farther

than

Justice

O'Connor

in

downgrading claims that aid to religious institutions violates the Establishment
Clause. In Rosenberger, he wrote the majority opinion that found that the denial
of funding to a religious organization to publish its newsletter violated the Free
Speech Clause. 67

"Discrimination against speech because of its message is

presumed to be unconstitutional., 68 For him, the key issue was neutrality: "We
have held that the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the
government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits
to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad

and diverse., 69 Since this program was neutral to religion, there was no violation
of the Establishment Clause. 70 This goes even farther than what Justice O'Connor
felt should be the standard. 71 According to Justice Kennedy, more of a balancing

is required than just the consideration of neutrality.
Similarly, Justice Kennedy adopted a position less restrictive of government

funding of religious entities than Justice O'Connor when he joined the plurality in
Mitchell.72 In that plurality, Justice Thomas stated that the issue involved in
whether the government could provide funding (Chapter 2 funds) to religious
entities was one of "indoctrination" attributable to government73:

66. But see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 (2000). See also Martin H. Belsky, Bush v. Gore-A
Critiqueof Critiques,37 Tulsa L. Rev. 45, 66-67 (2001).
67. 515 U.S. at 819.
68. Id. at 828.
69. Id. at 839.
70. Id. at 840.
71. See Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Rosenberger:
The nature of the dispute does not admit of categorical answers, nor should any be inferred
from the Court's decision today. Instead, certain considerations specific to the program at
issue lead me to conclude that by providing the same assistance to Wide Awake that it does
to other publications, the University would not be endorsing the magazine's religious
perspective.
The Court's decision today therefore neither trumpets the supremacy of the neutrality
principle nor signals the demise of the funding prohibition in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. As I observed last Term, "[e]xperience proves that the Establishment Clause,
like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily be reduced to a single test." When bedrock
principles collide, they test the limits of categorical obstinacy and expose the flaws and
dangers of a Grand Unified Theory that may turn out to be neither grand nor unified.
Id. at 849, 852 (citation and internal cross-refernce omitted).
72. 530 U.S. 793.
73. Id. at 808 ("Considering Chapter 2 in light of our more recent case law, we conclude that it
neither results in religious indoctrination by the government nor defines its recipients by reference to
religion.").
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Chapter 2 does not result in governmental indoctrination, because it determines
eligibility for aid neutrally, allocates that aid based on the private choices of the
parents of schoolchildren, and does not provide aid that has an impermissible
74
to religion.
content. Nor does Chapter 2 define its recipients by reference

Justice O'Connor felt that the plurality decision "announces a rule of
not enough. There must not be any
unprecedented breadth., 75 Neutrality alone• •is76
endorsement-direct or indirect-of religion.
Thus, it would appear that Justice Kennedy, even more than Justice
O'Connor, would need some very persuasive reasons to bar funding under a
"neutral" program that provided money to students for theology and nontheology study. By joining the majority in Davey, he accepts state sovereignty as
such a set of reasons.
This perspective was previewed in Justice Kennedy's previous actions and
decisions. He joined the opinion of Justice O'Connor in New York, described
above,77 barring the federal government from forcing a state to accept title to
property. He joined the majority in a series of cases limiting the federal
78
government's power over a state under the Commerce Clause, and even under
the
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.7 9 Finally, he joined
8
0
majority in a series of cases providing for state immunity from federal suits.
Like Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy is fervent in support of state
independence and sovereignty. In United States v. Lopez, 81 he wrote a concurring

74. Id. at 829. Specifically, the majority opinion stated that "[I]t is clear that Chapter 2 aid 'is
allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made
available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis."' Id. (quoting
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231). Further: "The program makes a broad array of schools eligible for aid
without regard to their religious affiliations or lack thereof. We therefore have no difficulty concluding
that Chapter 2 is neutral with regard to religion." Id. at 829-830 (citations omitted).
75. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837 (concurring). Justice O'Connor continued:
Reduced to its essentials, the plurality's rule states that go-ernment aid to religious schools
does not have the effect of advancing religion so long as the aid is offered on a neutral basis
and the aid is secular in content. The plurality also rejects the distinction between direct and
indirect aid, and holds that the actual diversion of secular aid by a religious school to the
advancement of its religious mission is permissible. Although the expansive scope of the
plurality's rule is troubling, two specific aspects of the opinion compel me to write
separately. First, the plurality's treatment of neutrality comes close to assigning that factor
singular importance in the future adjudication of Establishment Clause challenges to
government school aid programs. Second, the plurality's approval of actual diversion of
government aid to religious indoctrination is in tension with our precedents and, in any
event, unnecessary to decide the instant case.
Id. at 837-38.
76. Id. at 867.
77. Supra nn. 58-59 and accompanying text.
78. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997); U.S. v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
79. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-27.
80. See Bd. of Trustees of the U. of Ala. v. Garrett,531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel, 528 U.S. 62; Seminole
Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
81. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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opinion stressing that "federalism was82 the unique contribution of the Framers to
political science and political theory.",
In Lopez, the issue was a federal statute that infringed on state areas of
concern. In Davey, the state was applying its own constitutional provision and was
one of many states that had adopted similar provisions.

In both cases, Justice

Kennedy must have felt that upholding the state's right to apply its own doctrine is
consistent with our constitutional model of two sovereigns. 83
The importance of state sovereignty was stressed again by Justice Kennedy

when he wrote the majority opinion in Alden v. Maine.84 This case involved the
application of immunity of the state from suit under a federal statute even in the
state's own courts. The Constitution, wrote Justice Kennedy, recognizes the states
as "sovereign entities. '85 Within their own sphere, the states are not ordinarily
subject to challenge.86 What can be more within its sphere than implementing
its
8
own constitution, and deciding how money is to be spent and not spent? 8
V.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST

David Garrow has written that "William H. Rehnquist has had remarkably
consistent legal views ... since his ... elevation to the Court in 1972. " 89 This is
especially true as to issues of separation of church and state9° and as to
federalism. 9
In Wallace v.Jaffree9 a majority of the Supreme Court found an Alabama
statute that mandated a "Moment of Silence" in public schools to be in violation
of the Establishment Clause because the legislature's clear and stated intent was
to provide for prayer in the schools. Then-Justice Rehnquist dissented and argued
that the Establishment Clause was never intended to create a "wall of separation"
between church and state, but only to forbid preference of one religious sect over

82. Id. at 575.
83. In Lopez, Justice Kennedy stressed the need for state authority: "The statute now before us
forecloses the States from experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States
lay claim by right of history and expertise .
I..."
Id. at 583 (concurring).
84. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
85. Id. at 713 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n. 15).
86. See id. at 714:
The federal system established by our Constitution preserves the sovereign status of the
States in two ways. First, it reserves to them a substantial portion of the Nation's primary
sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status. The
States "form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within
their respective spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is subject to
them, within its own sphere."
(quoting The FederalistNo. 39 (James Madison)).
87. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460.
88. Compare Nati. League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), with Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557
(Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 580 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
89. David J. Garrow, William H. Rehnquist in the Mirror of Justices, in The Rehnquist Court: A
Retrospective 274, 274-75 (Martin H. Belsky ed., Oxford U. Press 2002).
90. Id. at 277.
91. See e.g. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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another. 93 Specifically, Rehnquist wrote that the Constitution did not forbid
government providing benefits to religious institutions or to individuals who
wished to use government funds at religious entities. 94
Similarly, as to federal-state balance, then-Justice Rehnquist wrote in
National League of Cities v. Usery,95 quoting an earlier opinion by Chief Justice
Chase:
Both the States and the United States existed before the Constitution. The
people, through that instrument, established a more perfect union by substituting a
national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of
the Confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon
the States. But in many articles of the Constitution the necessary existence of the
States, and, within their
proper spheres, the independent authority of the States, is
96
distinctly recognized.
National League of Cities declared unconstitutional federal mandates for
minimum wages for state workers. It was later overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.97 In his dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist
reiterated his belief in the sovereignty of states and also that the Court would soon
swing back to his perspective:
National League of Cities . . .recognized that Congress could not act under its
commerce power to infringe on certain fundamental aspects of state sovereignty that

are essential to "the States' separate and independent existence."... I do not think
it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a
principle that98will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority
of this Court.

As Chief Justice, Rehnquist has been able to build majorities. Part of this
ability is based on ideology. 99 Part is based on Rehnquist's skill as Chief Justice. °°

93. Id. at 92, 113. See id. at 106:
[Historically], the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment had acquired a wellaccepted meaning: it forbade establishment of a national religion, and forbade preference
among religious sects or denominations. . . . The Establishment Clause did not require
government neutrality between religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal
Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion. There is simply no historical
foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to build the "wall of separation"
that was constitutionalized in Everson.
94. Id. at 111-12 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 799
(1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
95. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
96. Id. at 844 (quoting Lane County v. Or., 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868)).
97. 469 U.S. 528.
98. Id. at 579-80.
99. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, in The
Rehnquist Court: A Retrospective 195 (Martin H. Belsky ed., Oxford U. Press 2002). "[Rlesults usually
depend on whether the conservative bloc of Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas can get the votes of
O'Connor and Kennedy. Frequently they do and many cases have been decided by five to four
margins with that group in the majority." Id. at 195.
100. See Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court 373-75 (Oxford U. Press 1993)
(comparing the styles of Rehnquist and Burger and comparing Rehnquist's ability to forge majorities
with that of Earl Warren).
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In any event, he has been able to develop a set of winning core principles) 0 ' Two
of these
principles are the enhancement of state authority, sovereignty and
102
power, and "antidisestablishmentarianism," providing for more flexibility in
government support of religion. 1°3
On federalism, Rehnquist has joined in the majority opinions, often written
by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,' °4 narrowing the scope of Congress's power to
regulate states and reaffirming the validity of state sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment,
and broadening state immunity from lawsuits brought under federal
10 5
statutes.
But as Chief Justice, who selects who writes the opinion when he is in the
majority, Rehnquist has directly expressed his opinions and ambitions for the
Rehnquist Court jurisprudence.

For example, in Lopez, he noted that the

Supreme Court had been granting broader and broader authority to the federal
government. °6 It was now time to call a halt to this trend. 7 Five years later, in
United States v. Morrison, °8 he was more direct. There are certain key areas of
state concern that are closely tied to state sovereignty. °9 And it is the province of
the Supreme Court to protect the states and decide how far the federal
government can go in regulating these areas."0 For the Chief Justice, as indicated
in his earlier opinion in National League of Cities, how a state decides to spend its
money is one such key area."'
VI.

RECONCILING THE TWO CORE PRINCIPLES

Three justices are strong proponents of more flexibility in allowing
government funding of religion and in expanding state authority. To reconcile
these two core principles, Chief Justice Rehnquist chose to write the Davey
opinion himself. He would balance the two principles and come up with a
resolution-a "play in the joints" that would allow some flexibility to the states

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See Chemerinsky, supra n. 99.
Id. at 197.
See Belsky, supra n. 3.
See supra nn. 57, 62-64, 84-88 and accompanying text.
See Chemerinsky, supra n. 99, at 197.
514 U.S. at 552-63.
Id. at 567-68:

To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly,
some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to
congressional action. The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of
additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us
to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something
not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local. This we are unwilling to do.
(internal cross-references and citations omitted).
108. 529 U.S. 598.
109. Id. at 615-16.
110. Id. at 616 n. 7.
111. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra n. 16, at 68-69.
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but yet not determine how far the states could go in not funding sectarian
institutions or programs.12
On the side of federalism:
And the subject of religion is one in which both the United States and state
constitutions embody distinct views-in favor of free exercise, but opposed to
establishment-that find no counterpart with respect to other callings or
professions. That a State would deal differently with religious education for the
ministry than with education for other callings is a product of these views, not
evidence of hostility toward religion.
Even though the differently worded Washington Constitution draws a more
stringent line than that drawn by the United States Constitution, the interest it seeks
to further is scarcely novel. In fact, we can think of few areas in which a State's
antiestablishment interests come more into play. Since the founding of our country,
there have been popular uprisings against procuring taxpayer funds to support
church leaders, which was one of the hallmarks of an "established" religion." 3
Most States that sought to avoid an establishment of religion around the time of
constitutions formal prohibitions against using tax funds
the founding placed in their
14
to support the ministry.

On the side of more flexibility to fund religious programs, the Court limited
its analysis to the funding of the training of ministers, " 5 and did not address the
more general Blaine amendment question."'
VII. CONCLUSION
So what happens next? Oklahoma's provision bars the use of funds for
prison education, community drug programs, or school voucher systems. If it
came before a state or federal court or the Supreme Court,I would it be upheld?
I believe, despite my pre-Davey certainty, it would. At least one court has upheld
the validity of its state constitutional provision barring vouchers, even though the
system was found valid under the United States Constitution.11
Will such a case be decided on niceties like whether the voucher system or
prison or drug program is a "subsidy" like that in Locke v. Davey or a broad-based
"neutral" expenditure of funds that cannot discriminate?" 9 Probably not! Rather,
it will be decided on how many of the three justices balance their concerns in favor

112. Davey, 540 U.S. at 715.
113. Id. at 722 (footnotes and citations omitted).
114. Id. at 723.
115. Id. at 716, 719. See id. at 721-22, nn. 4-5.
116. Davey, 540 U.S. at 723 n. 7. See Mauro,supra n. 25, at 7.
117. See Duncan, supra n. 18, at 495; Lupu & Tuttle, supra n. 16, at 69.
118. See Greg Winter, Florida Court Rules Against Religious School Vouchers, N.Y. Times A15
(Aug. 17, 2004). Compare Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (upholding Ohio's voucher system under the
Establishment Clause).
119. See Frank S. Ravitch, Law and Religion, A Reader: Cases, Concepts, and Theory 395-96 (West
2004).
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of federalism against their desire to loosen restrictions on government funding of
religion.
I put my money on federalism-especially when we are dealing with a state
constitution.12 But, of course, this will not be the end of the issue. States will now
be asked to amend their constitutions to provide for more funding for religious
entities and programs. Or state courts will be asked to interpret their constitutions
to limit the impact of their own state's law.

120. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Unanswered Questions: October Term 2003, 7 Green Bag 323, 333
(2004); Lupu & Tuttle, supra n. 16, at 68.
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